Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2

Article 4

5-26-2006

Outsourcing Information Technology to India:
Explaining Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment
and Contracting in the Software Industry
Michael J. Meehan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the International Business Commons, Law Commons, and the Management Information
Systems Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Meehan, Outsourcing Information Technology to India: Explaining Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment and Contracting in the
Software Industry, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. R. 285 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol2/iss2/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

OUTSOURCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA:
EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND CONTRACTING IN THE
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
Michael J. Meehan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Changes to the Indian economy in the 1980s and 1990s paved
the way for U.S. companies to use lower-cost Indian labor,
especially in the information technology (IT) sector. Over the past
decade, U.S. software companies have increased their use of lowercost Indian software developers. However, U.S. companies have
not organized their use of the Indian software developers in a way
consistent with prevailing foreign direct investment (FDI) theories
of researchers like Williamson, Wells, and Huang. This paper will
provide background on the Indian economy and FDI theories and
refine previous FDI theory to recognize how U.S. companies are
actually making use of lower-cost Indian labor force.
Part II will provide background on India’s economic reform and
the role of Indian software workers on the IT boom in the U.S. in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. It also will discuss the current level
of outsourcing to India in the software industry. Part III will
examine the FDI theories, which predict that U.S. firms should
utilize the lower-cost Indian IT labor. Part IV will provide evidence
that U.S. software companies use the lower-cost Indian labor in a
manner different from that predicted by prevalent FDI theories.
This part will also attempt to explain actual investment patterns.
Finally, Part V will propose a follow-up study to investigate the
patterns of U.S. software outsourcing.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Indian Economy
Prior to economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, a
bureaucratic system often called the “License Raj” controlled the
Indian economy.1 The system employed centralized government
decision-making bodies to control companies’ entry into particular
market sectors.2 The Indian government instituted the system
because it believed that centralized control of the market would
better protect the Indian economy from domination by foreign
actors.3 The system regulated domestic and foreign entry into
industrial sectors, controlled diversification of companies, and
determined the allocation of resources and government
investments.4 As a result, once the government licensed a company
to operate in a certain sector, it was relatively free from market
competition.5 This system led to corruption and stifled the Indian
economy; during that time India’s economic growth rate stood at a
less than four percent in terms of gross domestic product (GDP).6
In the 1980s, the government of Rajiv Gandhi made minor
reforms to “encourage capital-goods imports, relax industrial
regulations, and rationalize the tax system.”7 Reforms continued in
1991, where the Indian government engaged in reducing the
number of industry sectors covered by government licensing
schemes, simplifying the procedural rules and regulations
governing industry, opening previously public-only market sectors

1

Ilyana Kuziemko & Geoffrey Rapp, India's Wayward Children: Do Affirmative
Action Laws Designed to Compensate India's Historically Disadvantaged Castes
Explain Low Foreign Direct Investment by the Indian Diaspora?, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 323, 347 (2001).
2
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 49–51
(Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
3
Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism:
India, 83 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1609 (1997).
4
BHAGWATI, supra note 2, at 49–51.
5
Kuziemko & Rapp, supra note 1, at 347.
6
J. Bradford DeLong, India Since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative,
MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ANALYTICAL COUNTRY STUDIES 3 (Dani Rodrik ed.,
2001), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Growth%20volume/DeLongIndia.pdf.
7
Dani Rodrik, Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep
Determinants of Economic Growth, MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ANALYTICAL
COUNTRY STUDIES 19 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2002).
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to private actors, reducing funding for selected public sector
undertakings, and liberalizing foreign direct investment, trade, and
exchange rate policies.8
Under the partially relaxed government controls of the 1980s,
the Indian economy grew at a rate just under six percent per year.9
Following the 1991 reforms, the annual growth in Indian GDP
continued at six percent.10 Some researchers, including Rodrick and
DeLong, view these early reforms as the springboard for India’s
long-term economic growth, not only providing legal reforms, but
also initiating a change in attitude towards relaxed government
regulation.11 On the other hand, Panagariya, an Indian economics
professor, believes that expanded borrowing in the 1980s produced
India’s initial economic boom and that substantive reforms in the
1990s sustained the initial boom.12 Regardless of the exact reasons,
thirty-five years of sustained economic growth provides persuasive
empirical evidence that the reforms in India enabled changes in its
economy that opened the door for both domestic production and
foreign investment.13
The 1991 reforms also included increased protection of
intellectual property (IP). While IP laws are considered stronger in
India than in China and other developing countries, they are not
typically considered as strong as IP laws in the U.S.14 Starting in
1994, Indian copyright law provided copyright protection for
computer programs.15 From 2002 to 2005, however, India
completely excluded computer programs from patent protection.16
As of January 1, 2005, the legislators relaxed those restrictions to
comply with the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-

8
MINISTRY OF FIN., GOV'T OF INDIA, THE ECONOMY SURVEY OF INDIA, ch. 7
(1997).
9
DeLong, supra note 6, at 3.
10
Sophi Beach, The Tiger in Front: India and China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2005,
available at http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3689214.
11
Rodrik, supra note 7, at 19; Delong, supra note 6, at 5–6.
12
Arvind Panagariya, India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of Reforms 4–7
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/04/4, 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0443.pdf.
13
Panagariya provides evidence of increased foreign investment in India since
1990. Id. at 34.
14
Nathan E. Stacy, Comment, The Efficacy and Fairness of Current Sanctions in
Effecting Stronger Patent Rights in Developing Countries, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
263, 294–95 (2004).
15
The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1994.
16
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002.
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Specifically, India
now excludes only “a computer programme per se other than its
technical application to industry or a combination with hardware.”17
While this is not as broad as software patent protection in the U.S.,
which does not provide additional patentability restrictions on
software,18 the 2005 changes did provide increased patent
protection for software. However, as noted by Professor Agarwal of
the Indian Institute of Management, India may need years to
develop the expertise in its patent office and in its courts before the
public can safely predict what is and is not patentable software.19
B. Indian IT Workers
During the worldwide IT boom that started in the mid-1990s,
thousands of talented Indians immigrated to the U.S. to take up
positions in the software industry. For example, in 2002, 47,000
(sixty-three percent) out of the 74,000 nonimmigrant temporary
workers obtaining H-1B visas to work in the computer-related
industries were from India. In fact, the U.S. provided more than
four times as many H-1B visas to workers from India than to
workers from China and Europe combined.20 The two previous
years reflect similar percentages—sixty-eight percent in 2000 and
seventy-one percent in 2001.21 The National Science Foundation
found in a recent survey that approximately one in four
mathematicians and computer scientists are foreign born.22 The

17

The Patents Bill, 2005, No. 32, Acts of Parliament, 2005.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that software programs are not excludable from patent
protection per se). See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
19
Anurag K. Agarwal, Software Patent, BUS. COGNIZANCE, Jan.-Feb. 2005,
http://mba.iiita.ac.in/janfeb05/brainwave_software.htm.
20
H-1B visas allow non-U.S. citizens to enter the United States to work in their
field of specialization for three to six years. In 2002, the 47,000 software and
computer-related workers from India represented seventy-three percent of the total
specialized H-1B nonimmigrants from India in all specializations. Other
specializations of note were “architecture, engineering, and surveying” at nine percent
and “medicine and health” at four percent. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 152 (2003),
available
at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2002/Yearbook2002.pdf.
21
U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 192 (2002), available at http://uscis.gov/
graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2001/yearbook2001.pdf.
22
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCI. & ENG'G INDICATORS, O-13 (2004), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/pdf/overview.pdf.
18
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survey did not specify in what country the computer scientists were
born, but related data for H-1B visas suggest that significant
percentages were born in India.
The growing presence of people of Indian descent in the
computer industry may have laid the foundation for the recent
increase of software outsourcing to India. In fact, some of the
Indian software workers have started their own software
outsourcing companies. These workers, in particular, provide
networks of previous colleagues and clients that augment their
outsourcing companies.23 While there is no empirical data on the
subject, it is possible that Indian-trained workers enhanced
confidence in the Indian software contracting industry with their
high quality work and high productivity levels.
C. Outsourcing to India
Companies are outsourcing a significant amount of computerrelated work to India. A recent survey from ITtoolbox found that
approximately thirty percent of IT companies worldwide outsource
overseas and that, of those, seventy-four percent outsource to
India.24The survey also found that companies more often
outsourced “technical jobs,” such as software development,
maintenance, and support, than less technical jobs, such as helpdesk support, training, and education.25 As the core of an IT
company, outsourcing technical jobs may lead to increased risk of
theft or loss of IP for U.S. firms (discussed at length below).
III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT THEORIES
Researchers like Williamson, Wells, and Huang laid the
theoretical foundation for determining how firms should choose to
capitalize on lower-cost foreign labor. These researchers consider
two alternative business structures: the Contracting Model and the
Foreign Direct Investment Model (FDI Model). In the Contracting

23

One of the interviewees, whose experience is later related in this paper, is an
Indian-born entrepreneur.
24
ITTOOLBOX,
2004
ITTOOLBOX
OUTSOURCING
SURVEY
(2004),
http://security.ittoolbox.com/documents/research/dell1_survey.pdf (last visited April
3, 2006).
25
Id.
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Model, a U.S. software firm26 hires an Indian software contracting
firm to work on a per-contract basis. Under this scheme, the U.S.
firm agrees to pay the Indian firm for work performed and the
Indian firm in turn provides software or related services to the U.S.
firm. In the FDI Model, the U.S. firm opens a subsidiary in India,
hiring Indian IT workers to develop software and provide related
services. In both models, the U.S. firm can reduce its overall
software development costs by tapping into lower-cost Indian
workers.
In a market without transaction costs or risk, companies will
employ the Contracting Model in order to capitalize on the lowercost Indian software professionals. In such a market, competitive
bidding allows U.S. firms to capture the lower cost of software
professionals without substantial overhead from the Indian
contracting firm.
A. Williamson and Huang
Williamson identifies two combinations of environmental and
human factors that render the Contracting Model untenable,
prompting a firm to adopt FDI Model.27 The first combination
occurs when the human factor of opportunism combines with the
environmental factor of small numbers.28 If, for example, a few
Indian firms begin to dominate a particular market, then the few
remaining firms may engage in opportunism and escalate prices.
Assuming that Indian labor remains cheaper than comparable U.S.
labor, U.S. firms will internalize the lower-cost Indian labor
through FDI, thereby bypassing the opportunistic Indian
contracting firms. However, except in situations where an Indian
software contracting firm holds a monopoly on expertise needed for
a software project, this combination of factors is unlikely to occur
in software outsourcing. So far, there has not been a shortage of
Indian contracting firms willing to do business with U.S.
companies.

26

This paper assumes a U.S. software firm throughout. However, most of this
analysis is generally applicable to non-U.S. firms that are utilizing Indian outsourcing
for cost savings. In addition, the theories described are applicable to non-Indian
contracting firms that are able to provide services below the market rate for U.S.
software development.
27
OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 9 (Free Press 1975).
28
Id. at 9–10.
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Williamson identifies a second combination of environmental
and human factors that better apply to India’s current situation.
According to Williamson, a U.S. firm may have incentive to open
an Indian subsidiary under the FDI Model when environmental
uncertainty combines with the human factor of bounded rationality.
29
Bounded rationality occurs when the human mind’s capacity “for
formulating and solving complex problems is [overwhelmed by] the
size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively
rational behavior.”30 In the case of cross-border projects discussed
herein, the environmental uncertainty may include exchange-rate
risk, expropriation risk, and legal risk, as well as economic and
market uncertainty.
1. Exchange-rate risk
The FDI Model and the Contracting Model both present a
similar exchange-rate risk. Under the Contracting Model, if a
contract is negotiated in Indian rupees, the U.S. firm will take on
the risk of the rupee-to-U.S. dollar exchange-rate fluctuation. This
risk could be substantial, especially for longer-term contracts,
considering that the U.S. dollar has nearly tripled in value relative
to the Indian rupee over the last 15 years.31 If the contract is
negotiated in U.S. dollars, the Indian contracting company may
build a premium into the contract to account for potential
exchange-rate fluctuations. Under the FDI Model, if a U.S. firm
opens an Indian subsidiary, the U.S. firm takes on the exchangerate risk of paying employees, taxes, property costs, and incidentals
in rupees. If a U.S. firm can negotiate a contract in U.S. dollars, it
may prefer the Contracting Model to the FDI Model in order to pay
an up-front premium to minimize exchange-rate risk. However,
given that the premium charged by the Indian contracting firm
should be at least as high as the expected exchange-rate risk, the
U.S. firm may be generally better off negotiating the contract in
rupees or adopting the FDI Model. Consequently, the similarity in
effect makes exchange-rate risk a less important consideration in
choosing between the two models.

29

Id.
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198 (Taylor &
Francis 1957) (emphasis removed).
31
X-rates.com, Historic Exchange Rates, http://www.x-rates.com/cgi-bin/
hlookup.cgi (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
30
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2. Expropriation risk
India is attempting to reassure potential investors that
investment in India is safe. In an address to a joint session of the
U.S. Congress in July of 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh showcased India as a safe destination for foreign investment
and strongly encouraged U.S. investment in India.32 However, the
ongoing battle between the Indian government, Bechtel, and
General Electric in the Dabhol power project attests to the potential
for expropriation risk in India.33 Vernon and Moran note that
foreign investors hold considerable leverage over the sovereign
government; however, when a project spends funds on fixed
infrastructure in the foreign country, the leverage shifts, and one
can expect an increased risk of expropriation.34 In regards to the
Dabhol power project, where over one billion U.S. dollars in
infrastructure were fixed in India, Vernon and Moran would argue
that expropriation became possible once the physical infrastructure
was in place.
The obsolescing bargain noted by Vernon and Moran is less
likely to affect FDI in the software industry. The software industry
is human capital-intensive, where the ratio of buildings and
equipment costs, relative to the cost of staff is much lower in the
software industry than in the energy or manufacturing industries.
The software industry, rarely, if ever, incurs large infrastructure
costs. The government would have little incentive to expropriate a
software subsidiary in order to obtain computers, desks, chairs, and
an office building or a lease to an office building. Therefore, unlike
the energy and manufacturing industries, in the software industries
the FDI Model poses little risk of expropriation. As a result,
expropriation risk is unlikely to affect a U.S. firm’s choice between
the FDI Model and the Contracting Model in the software industry.

32

Manmohan Signh, Prime Minister of India, Address at the Joint Session of the
U.S. Congress (July 19, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.indianembassy.org/
press_release/2005/July/23.htm).
33
Even though an independent tribunal ruled in favor of Bechtel and General
Electric as to the expropriation in September of 2003, Bechtel and General Electric
continued to struggle to regain their investment. See id.
34
THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE NEW POLICY
AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 142–43 (Inst. for
Int'l Econ. 1998); see also RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF US ENTERPRISES 46–48 (Basic Books 1971).
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3. Market and economic risk
Market uncertainty may provide U.S. software companies
incentive to adopt the FDI Model. Consider the situation where a
U.S. firm hires an Indian software development team (either
through FDI or contracting) to expand into an area expected to
grow—for example, enterprise software. The software will take one
year to build and test. If, while the firm is still developing the
software, Microsoft deploys substantially identical enterprise
software at half the price that the U.S. firm expects to sell its
product, the U.S. firm may have to terminate its enterprise software
project. If the firm adopted the FDI Model, it may be able to
terminate the project and recoup the human capital costs by altering
the project. If the altered project is sufficiently similar, some of the
software code may be reusable. Even if the altered project were not
similar, the expertise of the team working on the project would be
useful on other projects.
In the same hypothetical situation, the U.S. firm adopting the
Contracting Model may choose to terminate the contract. In such
case, the U.S. firm is likely to be held liable for damages.
Theoretically, the U.S. firm could renegotiate with the Indian
contracting company in order to gain some of these posttermination advantages seen for the FDI Model such as software
code reuse and access to expertise. However, in reality, the U.S.
firm will be in an unfavorable bargaining position because the
Indian contracting company will have exclusive rights on the
expertise created by the programmers from the first project and will
be able to negotiate a higher price (relative to its costs) for this
retained expertise. According to duration calculations, a new
software team could take up to eighty percent more time on a
follow-on software project than would the original team.35
In a world of perfect information, the Indian contracting
company may be able to negotiate up to the value that the expertise
would provide to the U.S. firm. Even in a world of imperfect
information, the Indian contracting firm will be able to negotiate
some of the value of the expertise created by the first project,
thereby forcing the U.S. firm to repay for the expertise it originally
paid the Indian contracting company to develop. Given the better

35

William Roetzheim, Estimating and Managing Project Scope for Maintenance
and Reuse Projects, CROSSTALK, J. OF DEF. SOFTWARE ENG'G, Dec. 2004, at 9,
available at http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2004/12/0412Roetzheim.html.
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potential to recoup losses, in terms of expertise and code reuse,
market uncertainty may lead U.S. firms to favor the FDI Model
over the Contracting Model.
4. Legal uncertainty
The area of biggest environmental uncertainty in Williamson’s
framework for the software industry is the legal uncertainty. An
area of particular legal uncertainty in India is the protection of IP.
The uncertainty surrounding IP in India should lead U.S. firms to
adopt the FDI Model over the Contracting Model. In order for an
Indian contract firm or a foreign subsidiary to function, the U.S.
firm must transfer IP and expertise to the Indian development team.
The expertise and IP comes in many forms. In some software
projects, the U.S. firm may transfer to the Indian team knowledge
of how internal software modules operate. In more complex
software projects, such as revamping software systems, the U.S.
firm transfers the entire code or portions of the code to the Indian
team. With that code and experience working on it, the Indian team
gains knowledge of the algorithms and its application. All of these
things are IP in the broad sense. Some are trade secrets and some
are patented or patentable. Particularly, the code will be protectable
under copyright law. Some of this IP may constitute part of the
U.S. firm’s significant competitive advantage.
Although under the Contracting Model, the IP and expertise
transferred to the Indian contracting firm are protected to some
extent by the contract agreement and the IP laws in India,
uncertainty still remains, as noted above. Furthermore, some of the
transferred expertise is not protectable under contract or IP law,
such as the ability to use the U.S. firms’ internal software system
modules.
Under the FDI Model, U.S. firms gain protection through
employment law and workforce coherence in addition to IP law.
For example, employment law allows U.S. firms to enter into nondisclosure and other legal agreements with their employees, thereby
increasing the number of legal devices at the firms’ disposal.
Because the Contracting Model does not provide these additional
legal protections, Huang predicts that U.S. firms are more likely to
apply the FDI model if they transfer expertise.36
36
YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE
REFORM ERA 51–52 (William Kirby ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
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Workforce coherence, which is easier to attain under the FDI
Model, will also cause U.S. software firms to favor the FDI Model
over the Contracting Model. Workforce coherence is easier to
maintain under the FDI Model because U.S. firms have direct
control over the hiring and firing of India-based employees. By
contrast, under the Contracting Model, U.S. firms maintain
workforce coherence only if two conditions exists: (1) the U.S. firm
uses the same Indian contracting company for subsequent projects,
and (2) if the Indian company retains its employees and places the
same employees on subsequent projects for the same U.S. firm.
Furthermore, a U.S. firm has limited influence over which
employees the Indian contracting company retains and less likely
knows which employees of the Indian contracting company are
important to retain.
Workforce coherence is important for several reasons. First,
increased workforce coherence leads to a decrease in employee
divulgence of expertise or other IP. Often expertise and other
unprotectable IP are not valuable enough or recognizable enough
for third party elicitation. If the employee leaves, however, the new
employer might recognize and have access to the expertise or other
unprotectable IP held by the employee. Therefore, workforce
coherence makes it less likely for a competing firm or a third party
to acquire the expertise.
Second, retained expertise can save costs. Consider, for
example, a U.S. firm with experience in designing and building
applications for cellular phones that does not have in-house
development capacity to make a new solitaire card game for the
phones. If the U.S. firm hires an Indian software contracting
company to build the game, the firm would increase its return on
investment by training the Indian team to develop software for
cellular phones.
Under the Contracting Model, the only way that the U.S. firm
can continue to benefit from the initial training investment is to
continue to hire the same Indian software contracting company for
future cellular phone software projects. Doing so, however, may
bring about the situation where contracting becomes less
desirable—the combination of the environmental factor of reduced
numbers with the human factor of opportunism. The Indian
company will be in a position to negotiate a higher price for the
contracting work. It can negotiate the price up to the amount the
U.S. firm would spend on a competing Indian company to perform
the same task. In doing so, the Indian software contracting
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company can fairly accurately estimate the competing company’s
cost by calculating how much it would cost a different, non-expert
team inside their own company to perform the task. The net result
is that under the Contracting Model, the Indian company can
capture part of the cost savings inherent in repeat-player expertise,
thereby diminishing cost savings to the U.S. firm. In contrast, under
the FDI Model the U.S. firm captures its entire cost savings
associated with repeat-player expertise.
Third, workforce coherence is important because it enables U.S.
firms to negotiate directly with particularly valuable employees.
Consider the example of a U.S. firm developing software for
telephones. If only one India-based employee can consistently and
efficiently program the graphical display on the phones, she
becomes particularly valuable to the U.S. firm. Under the FDI
Model, if the employee attempted to leave, the U.S. firm might
retain her by negotiating a raise up to the cost savings she provides
on projects. By contrast, an Indian software contracting firm
operating under the Contracting Model would have less incentive to
retain the employee. Given the plenary nature of the software
contracting industry, the Indian company will not utilize the
employee’s specialized skills to the fullest as U.S. firms would
under the FDI Model—causing a relative under-valuation of
specialized skills. Therefore, compared to the U.S. company, the
Indian company will have fewer surpluses with which to negotiate a
higher salary and will be more likely let the employee go.37
Trade secret law is also available to U.S. firms for protection of
IP or expertise transferred to an Indian team under either the
Contracting Model or the FDI Model. Trade secret law, often
through the use of non-disclosure agreements or other contracts,
can protect U.S. firms from theft of trade secrets by either
employees or contractors, and therefore is applicable to both the
Contracting Model and the FDI Model. However, the FDI Model
provides a further protection for trade secret through increased
workforce coherence. Since most of the cases in which trade secrets

37

This assumes that the Indian software contracting firm has fewer cellular
phone software development projects than the U.S. firm. If the Indian firm were more
specialized and had more telephone software jobs, it would have more incentive and
available surplus to pay the specialized worker; however, this is not generally the case.
Software contracting firms tend to perform a broader range of work than in-house
software development teams.
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are stolen are brought against former employees or contractors,38
the FDI Model should expose U.S. firms to much less opportunity
for theft of trade secrets. Furthermore, as noted above, employees
with valuable knowledge are more likely to be retained under the
FDI Model than the Contracting Model.
U.S. firms may have additional incentive to utilize the FDI
Model over the Contracting Model when the Indian team creates
expertise or IP. Consider an example similar to the one above: a
U.S. firm wants to develop a solitaire game for cellular phones and
has never done so before. By adopting the Contracting Model and
hiring an Indian software contracting firm to develop the game, the
U.S. firm will obtain the game at a lower cost than it would if it
hired U.S.-based developers to produce the game. While the U.S.
firm can negotiate patent rights before entering into a contractual
agreement, absent such an agreement, the Indian firm will be the
default owner of any protectable IP it develops and may seek
additional rents with respect to the IP developed during the job.
However, given the desire to obtain the contract with the U.S. firm
and the uncertainty as to the protectability of and value of any IP
developed, the Indian contracting firm may forego negotiating the
rents with respect to developed IP.
Even if the Indian firm does not seek rents for IP that it
develops under the Contracting Model, the U.S. firm may still be in
an unfavorable negotiating position if non-patentable expertise is
created by the Indian team—such as the ability to efficiently
program graphics for cellular phones. In order to benefit from the
expertise created by the Indian team, the U.S. firm must expose
itself to Williamson’s reduced numbers dilemma. The Indian firm
will have the ability to negotiate follow-on contracts at a higher
price relative to its costs; costs are reduced due to the expertise
gained during the first contract with the U.S. firm. Difficulty
identifying the developed expertise places the U.S. firm at a further
disadvantage. In the telephone software example, where
programming graphics is particularly difficult, the Indian firm may
not even know to tell the U.S. firm that they developed expertise in
telephone graphics programming. Without first-hand knowledge,
the U.S. firm cannot identify or value the created expertise, thereby
incapable to negotiate for any of the cost savings created by the

38
Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV.
1076, 1080 (1988).
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expertise before the contract is signed, after the product is
delivered, or upon negotiation of follow-on contracts.
On the other hand, under the FDI model, a U.S. firm can better
benefit from and protect the expertise and IP created by the Indian
team through increased workforce retention in a way similar to how
it protects transferred expertise and IP. Given the closer
relationship between the Indian team and the U.S. firm under the
FDI Model, the U.S. firm is more likely to discover the IP or
expertise created by the Indian team and better position itself to
retain particularly valuable employees.
In sum, although expropriation and exchange-rate risks do not
weigh in favor of either the Contracting Model or the FDI Model,
market and legal uncertainty factors, weigh in favor of U.S. firms
choosing the FDI Model. Therefore, the theories put forth by
Williamson and Huang predict that most U.S. software firms will
utilize the FDI Model over the Contracting Model.
B. Wells
Wells theorizes that a U.S. firm will follow the FDI Model in
India only when the U.S. firm has an advantage over Indian
competitors and when it has a reason to internalize that advantage.39
Because U.S. firms have greater access to the more lucrative
Western customer markets, U.S. software firms have a market
advantage over potential Indian competitors, which may want to
utilize the same low-cost Indian IT labor. Although India’s
domestic software market is growing, it is still just a fraction of the
size of the U.S. and European software markets.40
Access to and understanding of the lucrative U.S. software
market is important for a software development firm to successfully
produce viable software products. Understanding of the U.S.
software market comes from a variety of sources: potential
customers, who describe needs during customer meetings;
investors, who often look to fulfill particular needs for other

39

Louis T. Wells, Jr., Mobile Exporters: New Foreign Investors in East Asia, in
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 182 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1993).
40
In 2004, the Indian domestic IT market was just under US$600 millions while
India’s IT market grew to US$21.9 billion in the United States. Indian’s IT Market
Grows to US$21.9 Billion in 2004, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 16, 2005. The U.S. domestic
software market was estimated at US$70 billion. THE SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS.
ASS’N, PACKAGED SOFTWARE INDUSTRY REVENUE AND GROWTH, available at
http://www.siia.net/software/pubs/growth_software05.pdf.

298

S PRING 2006

Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment

companies in which they invest; strategic partners, who often look
to fill needs in their organization; and employees who come from
other companies and have an understanding of the needs of those
companies and their customers. Taken together, the network of
customers, employees, and employers provides an understanding of
the software market that is difficult to replicate.
The market advantage provides U.S. firms with the ability to
produce valuable software innovations. After determining market
demands, U.S. firms can design and develop software products to
meet those demands. The process of creating innovative products
will lead to market risk, creation of IP and expertise, and transfer of
IP and expertise among software development teams for the reasons
discussed above. Consider the example of a U.S. software firm that
has developed numerous software applications for cellular phones.
If the U.S. firm finds a customer demand for a solitaire card game
(the firm’s market advantage) and decides to utilize an Indian
software team for its development, it will transfer expertise or IP to
the Indian team under either the FDI Model or the Contracting
Model. On the other hand, if the U.S. software firm has never
developed software for cellular phones, the U.S. firm’s India-based
software team will create the needed expertise. Regardless of
whether the expertise or IP is transferred by the U.S. firm or
created by the Indian team, the U.S. firm should internalize the
market advantage using the FDI Model rather than the Contracting
Model for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, under Well’s
theories, the U.S. firm will choose the FDI over the Contracting
because it has a market advantage over potential Indian software
competitors, and it has reasons to internalize that advantage.
IV. INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN INDIA
A. Investments are not Following the Patterns
Predicted by the FDI Theories
As predicted by Williamson, Wells, and Huang, many U.S.
firms adopted the FDI Model. For example, Agile (an enterprise
software company), SAP (a collaborative business solution
company), and Intel (a leading computer chip manufacturer) have
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all opened IT development centers in India.41 However, there are
also a number of firms hiring Indian contracting companies to
capitalize on the low-cost and well-trained Indian IT workers.42
Although it is difficult to tell what percentage of companies use
Indian software contracting firms as opposed to engaging in the
FDI, empirical evidence suggests that companies utilize the
Contracting despite the predicted benefits of the FDI.
In their work on New Institutionalism, DiMaggio and Powell
explain that a few U.S. firms may have adopted the Contracting
Model over the FDI for rational reasons and that other U.S. firms
may have simply followed even when doing so was less efficient.43
However, as noted in Powell’s critical analysis of his previous
work, sub-optimal practices may arise from a complex
accommodation of internal and external forces as well as from
differences among industries.44
To better understand why U.S. software firms are choosing the
the Contracting over the FDI, the author interviewed two vice
presidents (VPs) of Indian software contracting firms who have
experience with U.S. firms that opt the Contracting over the FDI.
The following section draws freely, without citation, from the
information obtained from the two interviews.
B.D. Goel is VP of solutions at Aztec Software and is
responsible for Aztec’s creation of client software solutions and for
Aztec’s IP service capabilities. Aztec is an Indian software
contracting firm with offices in Silicon Valley and London as well
as a development center in Bangalore, India. Over ninety percent of
Aztec’s 1,500 employees work in the Bangalore development
center. Aztec provides clients with a broad range of software
systems: from small projects, such as software installation

41

Bruce Richardson, Highlights From Agile Software and Agility, AMR
RESEARCH, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.agile.com/news/2005/amr_030205.pdf;
Innovative India; Research and Development, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 2004, at 65.
42
Approximately thirty percent of the IT companies surveyed in the 2004
ITtoolbox survey outsource to foreign contract agencies. Of those, seventy-four
percent outsourced to India. ITTOOLBOX, supra note 24.
43
Paul. J. DiMaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 65 (Paul. J. DiMaggio & Walter
Powell eds., 1991).
44
Walter Powell, Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 194–96 (Paul. J. DiMaggio &
Walter Powell eds., 1991).
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programs, to large projects, such as customer support management
(CSM) software suites.
Dr. Shafy Eltoukhy is VP of manufacturing operations at Open
Silicon. Open Silicon, an Indian software contracting firm with
offices in Silicon Valley and Bangalore, provides computer chip
design services. Both offices house software development teams.
Although Open Silicon is not a traditional software company, its
interaction with customers is software-based and its business shares
many similarities with traditional software contracting firms.45
Aztec and Open Silicon operate with similar project models. In
both companies, a U.S.-based management team provides project
leadership and daily software design management while Indiabased developers (and occasionally U.S.-based developers in Open
Silicon’s case) provide the work product. The U.S.-based
management acts as the primary interface between the U.S.-based
customer and the India-based development team.46
B. Contracting Companies are Providing a Hybrid Model
To understand why U.S. firms are not adopting the FDI Model
with the expected frequency, one must look to the structure of
Indian software contracting companies like Aztec and Open
Silicon. These Indian contracting firms internalize some of the FDI
structure to provide U.S. firms with a hybrid of the FDI and the
Contracting Models in the following manners.

45

Open Silicon’s clients provide the company with software code that describes
the desired functionality of the client’s chip. Open Silicon utilizes software-based
computer chip simulators to incorporate other functions that the clients may desire and
to examine the overall chip design. For example, a client may come to Open Silicon
with a design for a new mobile central processing unit (CPU) for a personal data
assistant (PDA). The client provides Open Silicon with a software program that
defines the functionality of the CPU. Open Silicon incorporates other functionality
needed to complete the PDA design in the software design, for example off-the-shelf
display processor and memory chips. Open Silicon will then design the “layout” for
the chip and test the completed PDA board to ensure that the integration of the various
components works properly. When completed, Open Silicon provides the completed
design as software to the client, and the client will send the design to a computer chip
fabrication facility to create and test the physical chip.
46
Open Silicon also provides some customers the option of U.S.-based
development teams. However, even in this case, the U.S.-based client rarely interacts
with the U.S.-based development team. All communication is handled by the U.S.based management teams.
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First, software contracting companies like Open Silicon and
Aztec provide U.S. firms with U.S.-based corporations with which
to negotiate. Aztec has sales, marketing, and management teams in
the U.S. while Open Silicon has the majority teams of the company
in the U.S., including software development teams. Though the
mere existence of a U.S. corporation on paper is unlikely to
improve the relations of U.S. firms and foreign contracting firms, it
is likely that the extent of the U.S. presence that the Indian
contracting firms provide does improve its relations with its U.S.
customers. The extent of onshore presence combined with the legal
structure provides potential U.S. customers with a familiar
accountability structure, which improves their comfort in utilizing
an India-based development team.
Second, the hybrid contracting firms have substantial on-shore
assets. The software industry is human-capital intensive. Therefore,
unlike other traditional outsourcing industries such as
manufacturing industry where companies have expensive fixed
assets like factories and machinery overseas, the fixed assets
maintained overseas in the software industry (computers, licenses,
etc.) are similar to the assets maintained in the U.S. for use by the
U.S.-based management teams (at least on a per-employee basis).
Therefore, a U.S. firm can tap into the lower-cost Indian IT labor
while maintaining a substantial portion of their total assets in the
U.S. Moreover, many of the assets maintained by Indian software
companies, and software companies in general, may be held as
liquid assets or easily liquefiable assets, such as stocks and other
securities.
Given that there are few fixed assets tied to the Indian
development teams, Indian software contracting companies can
provide the lower-cost Indian IT labor while maintaining a
substantial portion of their total assets in the U.S. Therefore, Indian
software contracting companies can provide substantial U.S. assets
for attachment to contracts. For example, Aztec Software provides
bonding for the services it offers in addition to the implied potential
to attach to its U.S. assets if one of its clients brings a suit against
it.
Third, Indian contracting companies like Aztec and Open
Silicon partially counter potential problems with IP creation and IP
transfer. The approaches to countering these IP-related
disadvantages include “IP isolation.” Both Aztec and Open Silicon
employ IP isolation techniques to 1) reduce the risk that one
client’s IP may leak to another client and 2) reduce the risk of IP
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theft. The first step in IP isolation is identifying which clients have
potentially conflicting IP. A contracting firm accomplishes this
identification by disclosing current client lists to new clients and
investigating any potential conflicts that the client identifies. Once
the Indian firm identifies a potential client conflict, the firm
engages in IP isolation.
A contracting firm can perform IP isolation physically or
ethically. A firm may physically isolate teams from one another if
they work on projects with potential IP conflicts. The physical
isolation may include placing competitive projects in separate
buildings or floors. Where physical separation is infeasible, Indian
contracting firms can create “ethical walls” between groups that
work on potentially conflicting projects by informing groups of the
conflicts and directing workers not to discuss those projects. Both
the ethical walls and physical separation reduce not only the risk of
inadvertent leakage of IP from one client’s project to another’s but
also the risk of IP theft by curtailing the number of workers with
access to a particular client’s IP.47 For example, Aztec Software has
two clients that are direct competitors with one another, Metreo and
Vendavo, both of whom develop price management software. Since
Aztec identified the conflict, the firm can maintain an ethical wall
between the projects by ensuring that employees are not crossassigned between competitive projects, instructing the teams to
avoid communicating about the projects with others working on
competitive projects, and physically separating infrastructure and
personnel as appropriate.
Indian contracting firms also encourage their clients to protect
their IP by determining what is “strategic” to their business and
what is merely “necessary” to the completion of a project. Mr. Goel
noted that “getting a software installation program to work
correctly is necessary for product roll-out, but it is not strategically
important. The merely ‘necessary’ development is the kind of work
we want from our clients.” He also noted that only a small
percentage of the software and IP created for any particular system
is strategic to the competitive advantage of the company. The rest
of the software and IP are necessary but do not provide the client
with competitive advantage. If U.S. software companies can

47
Indian contracting companies also provide IP isolation over time. Aztec, for
example, provides clients with a two-year non-compete agreement, which states that
Aztec employees who have worked on a client’s project must wait two years before
working on any competitive project.
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successfully separate the strategic IP from the necessary IP and hire
the Indian contracting firms to work only on what is necessary, they
can reduce the potential damage due to theft or leakage of IP.
Dr. Eltoukhy noted a similar strategy used by Open Silicon.
Open Silicon’s clients can provide their IP (their chip functionality)
in two ways: 1) as computer code representing the actual “logical
structure” of their chip or 2) as “black box” computer code
describing the size, connections, and functionality of the chip but
hiding the logic used in the chip. The code describing the logical
structure exposes the client’s IP more than the black box code does.
Open Silicon can supplement either type of code with additional
functionality to design the chip that the client desires. If the client
provides logical structure, Open Silicon can better modify the chip
layout to optimize chip size or improve power usage. By providing
a black box code, Open Silicon will have less flexibility in
optimizing the chip design but will be able to design the completed
chip without having access to the strategic IP related to the client’s
chip design. Therefore, Open Silicon’s clients can provide strategic
IP in black box form and avoid potential loss of strategic IP,
although they lose optimization.
It may be difficult for a U.S. software firm to determine what
constitutes the firm’s strategic IP. The U.S. firm will know how it
differentiates itself from competitors, but the IP related to that
differentiation may not be the company’s strategic IP. For example,
the U.S. firm developing games for a cellular phone may feel that it
differentiates itself from its competitors by providing more exciting
games. However, the company’s strategic IP may not be related to
game play in particular but, instead, may be an algorithm for
efficiently displaying graphics on the cellular phone. If the U.S.
firm successfully identifies and avoids outsourcing strategic IP,
then the firm will have more actual IP protection.
Dr. Eltoukhy also noted that reputation for IP protection is of
high importance in U.S. companies’ choosing among the Indian
contracting companies. Indian contracting firms must demonstrate
not only that they can efficiently create the software required by the
clients, but also that they can protect their clients’ IP. Since
information on the Indian contracting firms is widely available, any
failure to protect a client’s IP may be litigated and publicized, and
U.S. software firms have the knowledge they need to identify
reliable Indian contracting firms. If an Indian firm acquires a bad
reputation for IP protection, it will lose most or all of its business.
By contrast, the Indian firms with good reputations will keep

304

S PRING 2006

Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment

thriving. Therefore, market forces will lead to the survival of Indian
firms that protect IP well and the demise of those that do not.
Perhaps the Indian contracting firms described here as “hybrid”
could be considered variations on the contracting firms traditionally
considered under the Contracting Model. However, the fact that
these firms have substantial U.S. presence, tend to have significant
attachable U.S. assets, and are structured to provide some of the
advantages of the FDI Model seems to warrant a discussion of them
separate from the foreign contractors typically considered under the
Contracting Model.
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Hybrid Model
1. Advantages of the hybrid model
The Hybrid Model combines some of the advantages of the
Contracting and the FDI. The Hybrid Model reduces exposure to
Williamson’s dilemma of bounded rationality combined with
environmental uncertainty by avoiding some of the legal
uncertainty associated with the Contracting Model. Under Hybrid
Model, the two parties to the contract are the U.S. firm and the U.S.
branch of the Indian contracting agency, which are both
incorporated and maintain substantial assets in the United States.
Therefore, contract disputes or other litigation will be likely
governed by U.S. law, adjudicated by U.S. courts, and have
judgments rendered against U.S. assets. Because U.S. law and
subsequent judgments are more familiar and may be, or at least
appear to be, more predictable than international arbitration or
adjudication in Indian courts, U.S. firms may be more comfortable
with Indian contracting companies that provide the Hybrid Model.
Furthermore, the Hybrid Model can reduce the legal uncertainty
associated with transfer and creation of IP, primarily through IP
isolation and client retention of strategic IP.
In addition, the Hybrid Model allows U.S. firms not only to
avoid any marginally higher costs associated with setting up an
Indian subsidiary under the FDI Model,48 but also to engage in

48

It takes approximately seventy-one days to set up a business in India and costs
an average of US$383. Additionally, a U.S. firm adopting the FDI Model must
consider the cost and difficulty associated with the termination of employees in India
where firing costs amount to approximately seventy-nine weeks of the employee’s
wages. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS: ECONOMY SNAPSHOT—India,
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short-term expansion of its development team. If Mr. Goel’s
description is representative, U.S. firms develop strategic IP for
particular products in-house and rapidly expand their software
development capabilities using Indian contracting firms. Under
such scheme, the Indian contracting firms swiftly create the
software and IP necessary to bring the products to market. As the
need for the expanded development team declines, U.S. firms can
scale back the involvement of the Indian contracting firm. In the
FDI Model, as in any model where employees are hired, such
expansion and reduction of development teams is difficult.
U.S. software firms adopting the FDI Model may opt to hire a
smaller team of Indian employees to complete the software
development, thereby increasing the time to complete the software
project. The smaller teams and longer tasks result in a more stable
need for the employees’ services under the FDI Model. In contrast,
the Hybrid Model, like the Contracting Model, results in an
opportunity for the U.S. firm to utilize as large a development team
as is efficient to work on a particular software project, thereby
creating the product in a shorter time than can be achieved by a
smaller development team hired under the FDI Model.
2. Disadvantages of the hybrid model
The Hybrid Model has some disadvantages, mostly associated
with the Contracting Model. First, although the risk of IP theft and
IP leakage under the Hybrid Model is lower than that under the
Contracting Model, the Hybrid Model does not eliminate the risk.
The FDI Model will better protect IP transferred to the Indian
development team due to improved workforce retention and the
additional legal protection of employment law. However, as noted
above, the U.S. firm may greatly reduce the potential damage
caused by IP theft or leakage by sending only necessary IP to the
Indian contracting company.
Second, the Hybrid Model, like the Contracting Model, has the
disadvantage of loss of expertise. In the FDI Model, the U.S. firm
retains employees and, therefore, retains the expertise gained by
working on its projects. In both the Hybrid and the Contracting,

http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/Default.aspx?economyid=89
visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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employees of the Indian contracting company gain that expertise
while working on client projects.
Finally, where a U.S. firm utilizes the same Indian contracting
company in multiple, related software projects, the Indian company
will be in a position to negotiate for a portion of the savings
associated with the retained expertise, thereby reducing some of the
benefit to the U.S. firm of using the same Indian contracting firm.
However, the Hybrid and the Contracting have some advantage
over the FDI Model in that the U.S. firm will have access to the
aggregate expertise built up during the Indian contracting
company’s work with other clients.
D. The Hybrid Model and the Software Industry
The Hybrid Model is particularly compatible with the software
industry for two reasons. First, the Hybrid Model functions well in
the software industry due to its higher proportions of liquid assets
available for attachment to contracts and U.S. litigation. In an
industry requiring many fixed assets, a contracting firm will not be
able to shift as substantial a portion of its total assets to the U.S.
For example, in the manufacturing industry, where project costs
such as machinery and manufacturing facilities are physically tied
to a foreign country with inexpensive labor, the foreign-based
assets will be difficult to use as collateral or attach in a U.S. legal
action. By contrast, the software industry does not face the same
problem because a large portion of corporate assets consists of
moveable, liquid assets.
Second, contracting is practicable for software development
because it is location-agnostic. Indian software contracting
companies can send the products they built to their clients at the
speed of light and at marginal cost. Geographically distributed
software development teams can work from anywhere in the world
on software systems, even systems tied to particular hardware
servers in particular locations. Additionally, because lower-cost
Indian software developers are not tied to fixed assets in India, they
can go to the U.S. client’s site if needed. This is in sharp contrast to
traditional, non-digital outsourcing, where manufacturers have to
ship products among geographically disparate locations, and
transportation of the inexpensive labor would be impossible
because the labor force must have access to fixed assets such as
machinery. The location-agnostic nature of software development
overcomes the multi-site coordination problems normally inherent
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in establishment of new contract-based projects in India, thereby
improving the viability of contracting in the software industry.
E. The Future of Outsourcing in India
With the increasing strength of IP protection in India, U.S.
software companies should be less likely to adopt the FDI Model
and more likely to adopt the Hybrid Model or the Contracting
Model. As India toughens its IP laws, U.S. firms will have more
confidence in Indian contracting companies. Given the discussion
above, this trend may result in greater use of the Hybrid Model. If,
however, U.S. firms regard Indian IP laws as sufficient to protect
their interests, even against Indian contracting firms with no
substantial U.S. assets, the Contracting Model may prevail over the
Hybrid Model.
The primary reason for favoring the Contracting Model would
be that India-only contracting companies should have lower
overhead. Indian software contracting companies under the Hybrid
Model will be inefficient relative to their India-only counterparts
because of the resources expended in U.S. sales, marketing, and
management. On the other hand, it is conceivable that, in order to
compete with the Hybrid Model firms, the India-only firms would
have to maintain a similarly substantial presence in the U.S.,
thereby reducing the Contracting Model’s comparative advantage.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper explores an expansion of the theories of foreign
direct investment and contracting in the Indian software
outsourcing industry, showing how a new breed of Indian software
contracting companies adopting the Hybrid Model are approaching
the opportunities in that industry. However, much more work is
needed. First, understanding differences in the investment patterns
among large, medium, and small U.S. firms outsourcing software
projects to India49 may illuminate more about what drives U.S.
firms to engage in the FDI versus the contracting as well as
traditional contracting versus the Hybrid Model. In addition, an
examination of various outsourcing patterns among various types of

49

Large companies of over 1,000 employees are two to three times more likely
than their smaller counterparts are to outsource foreign contracting companies. NAT’L
SCI. FOUND., supra note 22.
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IT functions such as software development, maintenance, testing,
and technical support may provide insight into how U.S. firms
make decisions in entrusting software-related projects to foreign
entities.
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